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Abstract
Public defenders and other court actors most often
engage in behind-the-scene plea negotiating to manage
overwhelming workloads and to dispose of cases as
quickly and efficiently as possible. In prior work, scholars
have documented an increased reliance on plea
bargaining and the deleterious impact of the practice on
the legal process and the rights of individuals accused of
a crime; however, this research has not systematically
analyzed the decisions made, and the perspectives of
justice of society’s most disadvantaged and arguably most
important actors of the court, the defendants. Relying on
data collected in a Midwestern public defense system, this
Jeanette Hussemann, PhD is a principal research associate
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article focuses attention to the intersection of indigent
defense and plea bargaining by shedding light on the
decision-making processes and perceptions of justice
among indigent defendants. Our findings indicate that
regardless of innocence, defendants plead guilty because
it offers the quickest pathway out of court and with little
risk; however, misunderstanding and fear often mediate
decisions to plead guilty. Also, while the majority of
defendants perceive the plea outcome to be fair, they do
not always perceive the plea process as fair.
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I. Introduction
The United States formalized the provision of
public defense through the passage of the 6th
Amendment in 1789 and the unanimous ruling by the
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Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright in 1963.1 Since
this time, attorneys assigned to provide public defense
services to individuals who are accused of a crime, but
unable to afford legal counsel, have struggled with
demanding caseloads and a lack of funding to support
their work.2 To manage overwhelming workloads,
defense attorneys and prosecutors engage in behind-thescene negotiating to dispose of cases as quickly and
efficiently as possible.3 Because negotiations result in
pleas of guilty in over ninety percent of cases, a large body
of research has considered the implications of plea
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335, 344 (1963). While the
original decision of the Court applied to adult, felony
proceedings, the mandate has since been extended to
misdemeanor, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972);
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002), and juvenile
proceedings, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
2 See Eve Brensike Primus, Defense Counsel and Public
Defense, in REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL
PROCESSES 121, 121 (Erik Luna ed., 2017); Michael Barrett,
The Impact of Neglecting Indigent Defense on the Economics of
Criminal Justice, 61 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 681, 682–86 (2016) (using
Missouri’s public defender’s system to demonstrate the funding
issues); ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N. OF
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, Minor Crimes, Massive Waste: The
Terrible Toll of American’s Broken Misdemeanor Court 26
(2009), https://www.nacdl.org/reports/misdemeanor/ [https://
perma.cc/UZ79-VWKH]; NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICAN’S
CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
COUNSEL 52–64 (2009), https://constitutionproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GB7-UWZK].
3 See generally MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE
PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT
(1979); GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A
HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003); PETER F.
NARDULLI, THE COURTROOM ELITE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1978); Donald A. Dripps,
Guilt, Innocence, and Due Process of Plea Bargaining, 57 WM.
& MARY L. REV 1343 (2015).
1
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negotiations on criminal justice actors, including
attorneys, prosecutors, and the judiciary.4 Very little
research, however, has considered the impact of plea
negotiations on the individuals whose lives are most
affected by the practice: the defendants.
The goal of this research is to examine how the
practice of plea-bargaining influences indigent defendant
decision-making, court experiences, and perspectives of
justice. Research on plea bargaining dates back to the
1920s and 1930s, prior to the passage of the 6th
Amendment. Scholarly works by Miller and Moley in
1927 and 1928, and the publication of the Wickersham
Commission report in 1931, for example, are highly
regarded for their early considerations of plea bargaining
on the legal doctrine of criminal court procedures.5
Notably, in the first published issue of Southern
California Law Review, Miller opens an article entitled,
“The Compromised of Criminal Cases” with the
statement, “In theory there should be no compromise of
criminal cases,” but “[i]n practice, [] the condonation and
compromise of criminal cases is frequent and the
methods of evading the clear purpose of the written law
are varied.”6
Since these early publications, scholars have
documented an increased reliance on plea bargaining and
the deleterious impact of the practice on the legal process
and the rights of individuals accused of a crime. Legal
advocates argue that because pleas of guilty are
BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE., FELONY
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 — STATISTICAL
TABLES 22, 24 (2013); LINDSEY DEVERS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING (2011).
5 See 4 NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENF’T
(WICKERSHAM COMM’N), REPORT ON PROSECUTION 95–97
(1931); Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV.
97 (1928); Justin Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1
S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1927).
6 Miller, supra note 5, at 1–2.
4
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negotiated and agreed to outside of the courtroom and in
advance of sentencing, the plea process reallocates
control over sentencing decisions from the judiciary to the
prosecution.7 Because cases are so quickly resolved
through pleas of guilty, evidentiary and legal issues are
often suppressed and case investigation ceases to exist.8
The formulaic agreements on which plea bargains rely
often overlook the identity of those who are accused of a
crime, and thereby eliminate individualized mitigation
and consideration of rehabilitative responses.9 Moreover,
those accused of a crime find themselves pressured into
admitting guilt for fear of missing an opportunity to
decrease punishment versus extending the work of the
court which may result in harsher sentences down the
road. In 1978, Langbein went so far as to compare plea
bargaining to torture, stating that although our means
may be politer—“we use no rack, no thumbscrew, no
Spanish boot to mash his legs”—we still make it costly for
an individual accused of a criminal offense to claim their
constitutional rights.10
These concerns call attention to the importance of
understanding the impact of plea bargaining on the
experiences and perspectives of defendants and, in
MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 37, 67–68 (1998);
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464 (2004).
8 FEELEY, supra note 3.
9 See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing
Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901,
951 (1991) (“These guidelines also mark a changed attitude
toward sentencing—one that looks to collections of cases and
to social harm rather than to individual offenders and the
punishments they deserve.”); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy,
Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old
Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2101 (1989) (“One problem
underscored in this scholarship is that individual concrete
human voices and abstract, general legal rules often conflict.”).
10 John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI.
L. REV. 3, 12 (1978).
7
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particular, those defendants who cannot afford to retain
legal counsel. Today, indigent defendants compose the
majority of the criminal justice system, with research
indicating that between 60 percent and 90 percent of
defendants rely on court-appointed attorneys.11 In an
effort to highlight the experiences of the defendants who
most frequently interact with the criminal courts and the
plea process, this research utilizes semi-structured
interview data with defendants and administrative court
data collected in a Midwestern urban public defense
system between the years of 2008 to 2011. In the
following pages, we outline research related to the
intersection of public defense and plea bargaining, and
the decision-making process of indigent defendants and
perceptions of justice, in an effort to better understand
how criminal court processes are perceived by the
individuals who are most directly affected by their
outcomes. Our findings indicate that regardless of
innocence, defendants plead guilty because it offers the
quickest pathway out of court and with little risk;
however, misunderstanding and fear often permeate
decisions to plead guilty. While the majority of
defendants perceive the plea outcome to be fair, they do
not always perceive the plea process as fair.
II. Plea Bargaining in Public Defense
It is well-documented that the plea process has
become a cornerstone of the criminal justice system in the
decades since its introduction and indoctrination in the
late 1700s and 1800s. During this era, criminal justice
JUSTICE POLICY INST., SYSTEM OVERLOAD: THE COSTS OF
UNDER-RESOURCING PUBLIC DEFENSE 2 (2011); LYNN LANGTON
& DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC
DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007—STATISTICAL TABLES (2009); Carol
J. Defrances & Marika F.X. Litras, Indigent Defense Services
in Large Counties, 1999, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL. (U.S. Dep’t
of Justice), Nov. 2000, at 1.
11
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grew into a professional institution, incorporating formal
police departments and court officials who became
“repeat players” in criminal cases.12 Accordingly, the
court workgroup became accustomed to the routine
disposition of cases, and to the outcomes and sentences
associated with taking a case to trial versus negotiating
a plea deal. Once outcomes and sentences of pleas and
trials became familiar to court actors, a “going rate” of
the expected sentence developed such that the system
became routine and bureaucratic and, in doing so,
increased its capacity to process more cases and at a
quicker rate.13
Today, well over 90 percent of criminal cases are
disposed through pleas of guilty. Most court actors,
including prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judiciary,
argue that plea bargaining is a necessary tool in the
criminal courts, and particularly for those systems that
are overwhelmed by cases and depleted in resources.
Arguably, attorneys who are assigned to represent
indigent defendants are one of the primary groups of
court actors who are reliant on and benefit from the gains
afforded by the plea process.14 Since the inception of
FEELEY, supra note 3; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 149–55 (1993); LAWRENCE
M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE:
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA
1870–1910 (1981); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND
CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN
PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980).
13 Jonathan D. Casper, Having Their Day in Court: Defendant
Evaluations of the Fairness of Their Treatment, 12 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 237 (1978); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING:
THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS (1981); ROTHMAN, supra note 12.
14 Feeley and other scholars have argued that the plea process
is “a mixed-strategy game” in which prosecution and defense
“share in gains and losses.” FEELEY, supra note 3, at 27. For
instance, “prosecutor[s] gain[] by securing convictions.” Id.
Also, “defense gains certainty of outcome, and a reduction of
12
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public defense following the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Gideon, the system has struggled with considerable
challenges that shape the ability of public defenders to
provide effective defense.15 High caseloads and a lack of
funding constrain the amount of time that public
defenders can spend with defendants and conducting
case investigation.16 Even when attorneys are available
to meet with defendants, stress related to overwhelming
workloads may lead public defenders to encourage
defendants to accept pleas of guilty in order to facilitate
case resolution.17 In some cases, defendants may be
approached with plea deals and plead guilty to
misdemeanor offenses before ever meeting attorneys. A
significant implication of these practices is that many
defendants are pleading guilty to a crime without full
knowledge or understanding of their rights, options, or
the collateral consequences of the decision.

the sentence.” Id. Further, “the state is also a beneficiary
because it secures an admission of guilt, punishes the guilty,
and yet saves the expense of a trial.” Id.
15See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335 (1963)
(holding that indigent defendants are entitled to
representation, without indicating an infrastructure to allow
for such defense); THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 2, at
50–101.
16 JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 11, at 6. For example,
although the American Bar Association (ABA) recommends
that public defenders not exceed national caseload standards,
many public defenders and, in particular those working in
urban areas, typically manage double that amount of cases
annually. SUZANNE M. STRONG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATEADMINISTERED INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, 2013 at 5 (2016).
17 SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR., THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN INDIANA:
EVALUATION OF TRIAL LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES
169–70 (2016); NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. SERVS., A RACE TO THE
BOTTOM: SPEED & SAVINGS OVER DUE PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 39–40 (2008).
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III. Deciding to Plead Guilty
With approximately 6 million indigent individuals
receiving public defense services annually, and the
majority pleading guilty to a crime, it is critically
important to consider why individuals who are accused of
a crime decide to accept pleas of guilty. There is little
theoretical guidance on the decision-making processes of
defendants; however, there is some support to suggest
that theories of court worker decision-making may be
applicable to the decisions that defendants make.
The extent research on court worker decisionmaking offers three theories by which to interpret court
worker decisions to employ plea bargaining strategies.
First, organizational efficiency theories argue that
disparities in sentencing are the result of court actors
rewarding behavior and attitudes that are valued by the
institution—because court actors value the time and
resource-savings afforded by quick pleas of guilty,
defendants who accept plea bargains are rewarded with
less severe sentences.18 Albonetti, for example, states,
“Defendant cooperation exemplified by a willingness to
plead guilty is viewed, by the sentencing judge, as an
indication of the defendant’s willingness to ‘play the
game’ in a routine, system defined manner.” 19 Second,
theories of uncertainty avoidance argue that defendants
PETER NARDULLI, JAMES EISENSTEIN & ROY B. FLEMMING,
THE TENOR OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE GUILTY
PLEA PROCESS 203–05 (1988); Jo Dixon, The Organizational
Context of Criminal Sentencing, 100 AM. J. SOC. 1157, 1157–58
(1995); Rodney L. Engen & Sara Steen, The Power to Punish:
Discretion and Sentencing Reform in the War on Drugs, 105
AM. J. SOC. 1357, 1363 (2000); Malcolm D. Holmes, Howard C.
Daudistel & William A. Taggart, Plea Bargaining Policy and
State District Court Caseloads: An Interrupted Time Series
Analysis, 26 L. & SOC’Y REV. 139 (1992).
19 Celesta A. Albonetti, Criminality, Prosecutorial Screening,
and Uncertainty: Toward a Theory of Discretionary DecisionMaking in Felony Cases, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 623 (1986).
18
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are rewarded for pleading guilty because trials are an
inherently uncertain and stressful event for court
actors—decisions to pursue trials require prosecutors,
defenders, and judiciary to manage unreliable or
disreputable witnesses, questionable testimony, and/or
the use of less-direct evidence which may or may not
influence a decision of guilt. Plea deals are therefore
encouraged to reduce the uncertainty of decisions and
outcomes. A final theory, and one that is highlighted by
the sentencing guidelines, argues that the decision to
plead guilty as opposed to taking a case to trial is
associated
with
differences
in
perceived
blameworthiness.20 The federal guidelines state that
defendants should receive guideline-based sentencing
discounts or departures for “acceptance of responsibility”
and “substantial assistance to law enforcement.”21 Thus,
defendants who plead guilty, and therefore accept
responsibility, are rewarded with lighter sentences than
those who may not be perceived as accepting
responsibility and showing remorse for behavior.
In contrast to arguments that plea bargaining is a
coercive practice, there is some scholarly discussion to
suggest that a defendant’s decision to accept a plea of
guilty is arrived at through a rational decision-making
process that is not dissimilar to the process by which
court actors decide to employ plea bargaining. More
specifically, advocates of plea bargaining argue that the
process affords the defendant the opportunity to
participate in a rational decision-making process
whereby the costs associated with extending a case are
weighed against the possibility of reduced sentencing or
acquittal.22 Research in misdemeanor courts, in
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2009).
21 Id.
22 Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1117, 1136–38 (2008); Candice McCoy, Plea Bargaining as
Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea-Bargaining Reform, 50
20

[468]
11
10

PLEADING GUILTY
13 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 459 (2019)

particular, has shown that defendants care less about the
outcome of the case and more about the efficiency
provided by the plea process, which can offset financial
costs and time investment associated with extending the
length of cases.23 However, it might also be the case that
an efficiency theory may only apply to defendants
charged with less severe offenses. In other words,
defendants who are charged with a misdemeanor offense
that carries less severe sentencing outcomes might be
more inclined to plead guilty to “get it over with”;
whereas defendants charged with a felony offense that
carries more severe sentencing outcomes might be more
invested in the outcome of the case and, particularly if
they believe they are innocent. Another argument
suggests that defendants decide to enter a plea of guilty
in an effort to decrease the uncertainty of verdicts that
might be made by a jury or a judge at a later point in
time. In this regard, theories of uncertainty avoidance
argue that the plea process provides both defendants and
court actors with respite from the stress associated with
trial work. Finally, defendant decision-making may be
driven by blameworthiness. The decision to accept a plea
of guilty, therefore, is made in an effort to accept
responsibility and express remorse for the offense.
IV. Perceptions of Justice
Scholars often cite decision-making as an
important contributing factor to overall perceptions of
fairness and justice. Indeed, the most common criticism
of plea bargaining is that the process limits the
defendant’s ability to be involved in the procedures and
decisions made in their case. This criticism, however, is
CRIM. L.Q. 67, 69, 73 (2005); Bibas, supra note 7, at 2496–99,
2507; Douglas A. Smith, The Plea Bargaining Controversy, 77
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 949, 950–51 (1986); Langbein,
supra note 10, at 8.
23 FEELEY, supra note 3, at 187–89.
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juxtaposed by scholars who argue that the plea process
should be positively associated with perceptions of justice
because the process requires defendants to make the
decision about whether or not to accept a plea bargain,
which is associated with the outcome of their case.24
Despite the arguments on both sites, a relatively small
body of research has actually considered the implications
of plea bargaining on defendant experiences and
perspectives of justice and fairness. The studies that do
exist are more than thirty years old and rely on data
collected in very different court settings than the ones
defendants encounter today.25
Classical work on how defendants perceive court
experiences has focused on theories of distributive justice
JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE
DEFENDANT’S PERSPECTIVE 94 (1972).
25 For example, previous influential work on plea bargaining
by CASPER, supra note 13, supra note 24, by Tom Tyler, The
Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants’ Evaluations of their
Courtroom Experience, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51 (1984), and by
FEELEY, supra note 3, in the 1970s and 1980s predate
mandatory sentencing laws and “tough on crime” policies that
have reshaped courtroom justice and increased the stakes for
defendants. The effect of these laws can be seen most directly
in today’s record high jail and prison populations; however,
“tough on crime” policies have also increased both the number
of low-level, petty offenders charged in misdemeanor courts
and increased the amount of time and cost necessary to defend
criminal cases charged in felony courts, BORUCHOWITZ, supra
note 2 at 7, 25. In addition, defendants today face more civil
sanctions as a result of criminal convictions, including the loss
of legal immigration status, public benefits, housing, driver’s
license, and employment. BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 2 at 7, 25;
CASPER, supra note 13; CASPER, supra note 24; FEELEY, supra
note 3; Tyler, supra note 25; Becky Pettit & Bruce
Western, Mass Imprisonment and Life Course: Race and Class
Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 151, 153
(2004); Kathleen M. Olivares et al., The Collateral
Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National Study of State
Legal Codes 10 Years Later, 60 FED. PROBATION 10 (1996).
24

[470]
13
12

PLEADING GUILTY
13 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 459 (2019)

which extend early formulations of Adam’s equity theory
to argue that individuals assess satisfaction with
outcomes when they are perceived as comparable to the
outcomes incurred by others.26 Research in a variety of
contexts, including the courts, shows that distributive
justice is an influential factor in determining individuals’
perception of outcome fairness.27 For example, Casper’s
research in the 1970s shows that male defendants who
consider their outcome to be fair are most likely to
indicate that they perceive their sentence as a “good
break,” or a reasonable sentence relative to the going rate
for the offense.28
In 1975, Thibaut and Walker moved beyond the
basic
assumptions
of
distributive
justice
by
hypothesizing that satisfaction with court outcomes is
independently influenced by perceptions of procedural
justice—judgments about the fairness of the resolution
process.29 Theories of procedural justice argue that
evaluations of justice and outcome fairness are
influenced by the opportunities that defendants have to
be involved in the decisions made in their case (decision
control) and the opportunities that defendants have to
participate in the proceedings of their case by expressing
J. Stacy Adams, Inequity in Social Exchange, in 2 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 267, 272–76 (Leonard
Berkowetz ed., 1965).
27 E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 10–12 (1988); Adams, supra note 26, at
272–76; Dean B. McFarlin & Paul D. Sweeney, Distributive
and Procedural Justice as Predictors of Satisfaction with
Personal and Organizational Outcomes, 35 ACAD. MGMT. J.
626, 629, 634 (1992); Robert Folger & Mary Konovsky, Effects
of Procedural and Distributive Justice on Reactions to Pay
Raise Decisions, 32 ACAD. MGMT. J. 115, 115–16 (1989); Jerald
Greenberg, Organizational Justice: Yesterday, Today, and
Tomorrow, 16 J. MGMT. 399, 400, 402–04, 406 (1987).
28 CASPER, supra note 13.
29 JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975).
26
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their side of the story and presenting personal
information and evidence that is relevant to their case
(process control). One of the most striking discoveries of
the research completed by Thibaut and Walker was the
finding that satisfaction and perceived fairness are
affected by factors other than whether the defendant
“won” or “lost” their case.30 In this regard, Thibaut and
Walker’s research was the first to suggest that it is
possible to enhance defendant’s perceptions of fair
treatment without focusing explicitly on distributive
fairness.
More recently, scholars have extended theories of
procedural justice to include the behaviors of the actors
who implement legal processes, and to argue that
perceptions of fairness are closely tied to legitimacy and
the likelihood that individuals will obey the law.31 In this
regard, if defendants perceive court processes and the
behaviors of court actors, including publicly assigned
defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges, as fair, they
will be more likely to view courts as legitimate and
cooperate with their efforts and decisions. However, if
defendants perceive the processes and the behaviors of
court actors as unfair, they will be less likely to view
courts as legitimate and subsequently less likely to
cooperate with their efforts and decisions. Research on
policing practice indicates that when police treat citizens
Id; John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure,
66 CAL. L. REV. 541, 548–49 (1978).
31 See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER & YUEN HUO. TRUST IN THE LAW:
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND
COURTS (2002); Tom R. Tyler, Process Based Regulation:
Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law,
30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 297, 306–07, 309–10 (2003); Jason
Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and
Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 513, 514, 523 (2003); Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J.
Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice,
Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42
CRIMINOLOGY 253, 263, 270 (2004).
30
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fairly and with respect, police legitimacy is enhanced, as
well as citizen cooperation and support of police officers,
although limited research has focused specific attention
to the association between perceptions of criminal court
processes and actors, and legitimacy and law-abiding
behavior.32
V. Race and Class
Particularly important to understanding how
individuals accused of a crime make decisions to accept a
plea of guilty and their perceptions of justice is the impact
of race and class. When this research was conducted,
black defendants accounted for 37 percent of adults aged
40 or older and 55 percent of juveniles charged with a
criminal offense in urban courts.33 Today, black
individuals account for approximately 13 percent of the
U.S.
population,34
yet
black
men
represent
approximately 40 percent of incarcerated individuals.35
In addition, at least 40 percent of individuals imprisoned
cannot read, and over two-thirds are either unemployed

Lawrence D. Bobo & Victor Thompson, Unfair by Design: The
War on Drugs, Race, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice
System, 73 SOC. RES. 445, 467–68 (2006); Sunshine & Tyler,
supra note 31, at 514, 520; Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 31, at
275–77; Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and
Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in
Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 239–40, 242
(2008); Tom R. Tyler, Jonathan D. Casper & Bonnie Fisher,
Maintaining Allegiance Toward Political Authorities: The Role
of Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedures, 33 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 629, 645–46 (1989).
33 REAVES, supra note 4, at 5.
34 QuickFacts: Population Estimates, July 1, 2018, (V2018),
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/
fact/table/US/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/R3VH-SWKQ].
35 E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN
2016, at 7 (2018).
32
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or underemployed when arrested.36 Decades of research
on racial disparity and criminal justice, in conjunction
with the most recent deadly encounters between law
enforcement and black citizens, highlights the need to be
cognizant of the impact of relentless policing efforts and
harsh sentencing practices on the daily experiences of
poor, black individuals who are accused of a crime.
Crime policies in the 1980s and 1990s increased
the presence of the criminal justice system in the lives of
poor communities; the war on drugs, in particular,
increased the frequency and type of police-citizen
encounters in urban city areas. As a result, the criminal
justice system has not only become a primary source of
civic education for the poor but has led to distrust and
disillusionment with the “system.” Previous research
shows that this distrust has typically been directed
towards law enforcement and is shaped by race.37 Zerotolerance policing and the use of aggressive police tactics
BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA
(2006); MICHAEL H. TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING
AMERICAN DILEMMA 12–13 (2011); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL
JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); MICHAEL H. TONRY,
MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA
(1995); Kevin L. Jackson, Differences in the Background and
Criminal Justice Characteristics of Young Black, White and
Hispanic Male Federal Prison Inmates, 27 J. BLACK STUD. 494,
497 (1997); David C. Leven, Curing America’s Addiction to
Prisons, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 641, 646 (1993).
37 Bobo & Thompson, supra note 32, at 467; Jon Hurwitz &
Mark Peffley, Explaining the Great Racial Divide: Perceptions
of Fairness in the U.S. Criminal Justice System, 67 J. POL. 762,
767 (2005); Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Perceptions of
Racial Profiling: Race, Class, and Personal Experience, 40
CRIMINOLOGY 435, 443 (2002); Ronald Weitzer & Steven A.
Tuch, Race, Class, and Perceptions of Discrimination by the
Police, 45 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 494, 502 (1999); Richard
Scaglion & Richard G. Condon, Determinants of Attitudes
Toward City Police, 17 CRIMINOLOGY 485, 489 (1980).
36
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have prompted accusations of racial profiling and
contributed to tense relationships between law
enforcement and residents of high-crime areas.
Yet, the extent to which class and race are
associated with negative attitudes towards criminal
courts remains the subject of debate. It seems probable
that negative perceptions of law enforcement would
extend to the entire legal system. Bobo and Johnson, for
example, argue that black individuals “are far more
likely to believe” that the administration of criminal
justice is “riddled with systematic bias” based on negative
encounters with law enforcement.38 Hurwitz and Peffley
argue that because legal perspectives are based
predominantly on personal experiences with criminal
justice actors in communities, negative interactions with
law enforcement heavily contribute to an overall
perception that the justice system as inherently unfair.39
Moreover, Lind and Tyler assert that people who believe
the justice system to be unfair tend to evaluate the entire
political system as less legitimate—for much of the poor,
the justice system is as close as individuals come to the
government.40 Thus, low levels of support for police may
bridge across institutions, undermine support for the
broader system, and influence decision-making and
perceptions of justice related to court processes and plea
bargains.
VI. The Current Study
This study focuses attention to the intersection
between public defense and plea bargaining, and the
decision-making process of indigent defendants and
Lawrence D. Bobo & Devon Johnson, A Taste For
Punishment: Black and White Americans’ Views on the Death
Penalty and the War on Drugs, 1 DU BOIS REV. 151, 156–157
(2004).
39 Hurwitz & Peffley, supra note 37, at 767.
40 LIND & TYLER, supra note 27, at 70.
38
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perceptions of justice. The overarching goal of this
research is to raise awareness of and increase knowledge
on the experiences of the individuals who are accused of
a crime and, in particular, those who are financially
unable to retain private counsel and therefore are reliant
on the legal services of a public defender. In doing so, we
rely on the theories of decision-making and perceptions
of justice presented in the previous pages to guide our
analysis but shift the prior application of these theories
away from court actors and police to indigent defendants
and the courts. The key research questions that guide
this study include:
1. Why do defendants plead guilty?
2. How does the decision to accept a plea influence
perspectives of case outcomes?
3. Do defendants perceive the plea process as fair
and why or why not?
VII. Data and Methods
The findings of this study are guided by
qualitative and administrative data collected between
the years of 2008 and 2011 in the Fourth Judicial District
Court, located in Hennepin County, Minneapolis,
Minnesota. When this study was completed, Hennepin
County was the largest county in Minnesota with a
population of slightly over 1 million, or approximately 25
percent of the state population.41 Hennepin County is one
of ten judicial districts in Minnesota, and one of two
judicial districts with a full-time public defender office.
Over forty percent of the total number of adult criminal
PopFinder For Minnesota, Counties, & Regions, MINN. STATE
DEMOGRAPHIC CTR., https://mn.gov/admin/demography/databy-topic/population-data/our-estimates/pop-finder1.jsp
[https://perma.cc/ZX8H-M5T8].
41
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cases in the state were processed through the Hennepin
County court. Black individuals comprised fifty percent
of defendants who received the services of a public
defender in Hennepin County; twenty-four percent were
female (see Table 1 for a description of defendants).
Administrative data was obtained for all cases
that were referred to Hennepin County between the
years of 2008–2011. Qualitative data was collected in
2010 and 2011 and relies on observational data collected
in over 250 misdemeanor and felony cases across six
public defenders and semi-structured interviews with 40
defendants. Observations included defender-client
interviews and meetings held in jail, custody, court, and
defender offices, and defender-prosecutor negotiations
held in judges’ chambers and in and outside of the
courtroom. Cases observed for this study were not
randomly selected, but rather, were dependent on the
public defender’s calendar and the defendants that were
assigned to the defender on a particular day. All
defendants included in this research consented to the
study during their first appearance with the public
defender. Cases were tracked as they progressed through
disposition, unless the case was dismissed, the defendant
was rearrested, the case was transferred to a specialty
court, or the defendant failed to appear.
Informal defendant interviews were conducted
throughout the case, and forty defendants were formally
interviewed following case disposition. Informal
interviews with defendants typically occurred in court
hallways while the defendants were waiting for their
cases to be called and were used to collect data on what
they understood to be happening in their cases, desired
outcomes, perceptions of interactions with their public
defender and the plea bargains that had been offered, as
well as considerations for accepting or rejecting a plea
offer. Formal interviews occurred in a designated,
confidential space, including libraries, parks, and
correctional institutions. Formal interviews lasted
[477]
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anywhere from 30 minutes to 3 hours and included
questions about defendants’ understanding of the
procedures and outcome of their cases, the fairness of
their outcomes, decisions made in their cases,
experiences with their public defenders, and whether
they felt as if race/ethnicity impacted their court
experiences. Interviews also included questions taken
from prior research with defendants by Tyler and Casper
to collect data on procedural justice, including
perceptions of the processes and outcomes of their cases,
their ability to participate in the decisions made in their
case, and whether they felt as if they had a voice and were
respected.42
A. Analytic Strategy
Detailed notes were taken and recorded
throughout this research. Formal interviews were audio
recorded and transcribed for data analysis. To answer the
research questions of this study, analysis of formal
interviews on defendant decision-making included
responses to the following questions: Why did you accept
a plea of guilty instead of pursue a trial?; What factors
did you consider when you were making the decision to
plead guilty?; Did you originally intend or want to plead
guilty?; and, Did you understand the plea-bargaining
process and the outcome? All responses are coded into one
of three themes, following the theoretical literature on
plea bargain decision-making—Efficiency, Uncertainty
Avoidance, and Blameworthiness. Analysis of perceptions
of justice included responses to the following questions:
Do you think that the outcome of your case was fair?; Do
you think that the procedures were fair?; Were you
satisfied with the use of plea bargaining in your case?;
Did you feel as if you had the ability to participate in the
decisions made in your case?; Did you feel that you had a
TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006); CASPER,
supra note 24, at 90–91.
42

[478]
21
20

PLEADING GUILTY
13 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 459 (2019)

voice, and that you were listened to?; Do you feel that you
were respected?; Did you feel as if your lawyer wanted
you to plead guilty?; Did you feel that your lawyer was on
your side?; and, Did you feel that your lawyer was fair to
you?
In the following pages, we first present findings
on why defendants decide to plead guilty and then
consider perceptions of the plea outcome and process.
Because data was collected across varying levels of case
severity, we consider how perceptions differ among
individuals charged with felonies and less serious
charges. Past research has not considered how both
defendant characteristics and case severity interact with
and influence differences in court experiences; however,
it is possible that defendants who face more severe
sanctions, including imprisonment, loss of employment,
and loss of housing, may be more concerned with the
outcomes of their case and inclined to more actively
participate in the procedures and decisions made in their
case. In contrast, defendants who are confronted with
less severe sanctions may articulate less concern with the
procedures and outcomes of their case and, therefore, not
be as inclined to participate in their case. It is also likely
that defendants who are solely charged with
misdemeanors have fewer opportunities to participate in
the procedures of their case. Because misdemeanor
courtrooms often have many cases to consider in a
relatively short amount of time, attorney-client
interactions are quick and succinct.
VIII. Results
The characteristics of all Hennepin County
defendants, defendants who received legal services
through the public defender’s office, and the defendants
interviewed for this study are reported in Table 1.
Similar to courts across the U.S., Hennepin County
defendants are disproportionately poor, young, and male.
[479]
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Black defendants represent thirty percent of the total
population but fifty percent of defendants who received
legal services through the public defender’s office. Over
sixty percent of both the total sample and the defendants
who received legal services through the public defender’s
office were charged with a misdemeanor offense—an
offense that carries a sentence of up to a maximum of
ninety days in jail and/or a $1000 fine. The demographics
of defendants interviewed for this study are
representative of those who received legal service
through the public defender’s office; however, defendants
charged with a felony are overrepresented compared to
the number of felony cases represented by public
defenders (sixty percent and seventeen percent,
respectively). All defendants who were interviewed for
this study and who were convicted and sentenced
accepted an offer to plead guilty. Six defendants
interviewed had their case dismissed, but five out of the
six attended several court dates and entertained plea
offers until their cases were dismissed.
Table 1. Selected Characteristics of Defendants (D’s) in Hennepin
County, the Public Defender’s Office, and the Interview Sample
(2009, Most Serious Charge Per Case)
Defendants
Defendants of the
Defendants in
of Hennepin Public Defender’s
the Interview
County
Office
Sample
Total

59,484

21,848

40

n

%

n

%

n

%

Male

42,382

71

16,494

75

31

77

Female

15,060

25

5,073

24

9

23

Missing

2,042

4

281

1

--

--

White

18,204

31

5,180

24

13

33

Black

21,866

37

11,013

50

24

60

Hispanic

2,836

5

1,131

5

--

--

Other2

16,578

27

4,524

21

3

7

Gender

Race
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Age
< 18

171

<1

20

<1

--

--

18-25

18,600

31

7,781

36

14

36

26-35

17,576

29

6,026

27

9

22

36-45

11,680

20

4,297

20

9

22

46-55

8,406

14

3,054

14

8

20

> 56

3,051

5

670

3

--

--

Felony

5,229

9

3,794

17

24

60

Gross
Misdemeanor

6,257

11

2,813

13

2

5

Misdemeanor

38,748

65

15,032

69

14

35

Petty
Misdemeanor

9,250

15

209

1

--

--

Homicide

44

<1

31

<1

--

--

Assault

4,400

7

2,852

13

3

8

Domestic

706

1

509

2

4

10

Sex Offense

481

<1

304

1

2

5

Weapons

606

1

432

2

0

--

Drugs

1,463

2

831

4

4

10

Property

2,607

4

1,785

9

16

40

Alcohol

7,979

13

2,552

12

1

2

Conduct3

15,317

26

8,058

37

3

8

Traffic

24,797

42

4,222

19

7

17

Other4

1,084

2

272

1

--

--

Free,
Appointed
Counsel

21,848

37

21,848

100

40

10
0

Private
Attorney

11,720

20

--

--

--

--

None

25,916

43

--

--

--

--

Dismissed5

29,081

49

12,185

56

6

15

Convicted

15,567

26

6,238

29

14

35

Charge

Offense

Legal
Representation

Disposition
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Stay of
Imposition6
Continued7

2,187

3

978

4

6

15

12,621

21

2,428

11

14

35

Missing

28

<1

19

<1

--

--

Data obtained from Hennepin County Research Division; Data
contains all adult criminal cases filed; Data includes only one
charge per criminal case.
2 Includes Native American (3%), Asian (2%), Hawaiian (<1%), and
defendants whose race is missing.
3 Includes defendants charged with disorderly conduct, trespassing,
loitering, solicitation, obstructing justice, etc.
4 Includes defendants charged with land, housing, boating, animal
violations, etc.
5 Includes cases that were dismissed for mental incompetence (<1%)
and cases that were acquitted (<1%).
6 A stay of imposition (SOI) or stay of execution occurs when an
imposition is pronounced but delayed to a further date. If the offender
complies with the conditions of the court, a felony conviction will be
reduced to a misdemeanor conviction. If the offender fails to comply
with the conditions of the court, the court may hold a hearing and
impose/execute the sentence.
7 Includes cases with a disposition of stay of adjudication (SOA) or
continued without prosecution (CWOP). SOAs and CWOPs occur
when a defendant pleads guilty and the case is continued for
dismissal. SOAs and CWOPs do not result in a conviction unless the
defendant violates conditions of the court. SOAs and CWOPs include
cases that are diverted through probation and/or diversion programs.
1

A. Deciding to Plead Guilty—Efficiency,
Avoiding Uncertainty, and Blameworthiness
Table 2 presents the proportion of defendants who
pled guilty for reasons associated with efficiency,
avoiding uncertainty, and blameworthiness. The smallest
proportion of defendants (11 percent) indicated that they
pled guilty because they committed the crime and felt
that they needed to take responsibility for their
behaviors. The largest proportion (50 percent) of
defendants indicated that they pled guilty because of the
efficiency offered by the plea process. The second largest
group of defendants (38 percent) indicated that they pled
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guilty because they did not want to risk taking their case
to trial and receiving a more severe sentence.
Table 2. Defendant Decisions to Plead Guilty*

Total

Blameworthiness
n
%

Efficiency
n
%

Uncertainty
Avoidance
n
%

4

11.7

17

50.0

13

38.3

Gender
Male

2

8.0

13

52.0

10

40.0

Female

2

22.0

4

44.6

3

33.4

2

15.4

6

46.1

5

38.5

Black

2

10.5

10

52.6

7

36.9

Other

--

--

1

50.0

1

50.0

1

9.0

7

63.6

3

27.2

3

13.0

10

43.5

10

43.5

Race
White

Charge
Misdemeanor
and Gross
Felony
Priors
Yes

2

8.0

13

52.0

10

40.0

No

2

22.2

4

44.5

3

33.3

--

--

2

33.3

4

66.7

In Custody
Yes

No
4
14.3
15
53.6
9
32.1
* Results do not include those defendants whose case was dismissed
(N = 6)

Black and white defendants, and those with and
without prior convictions, indicated that they pled guilty
because of the time and money savings associated with
accepting a plea deal. Two-thirds of defendants who were
facing a less severe charge than a felony pled to “get it
over with,” and half of those charged with a felony made
the same decision. The finding that individuals charged
with a felony enter pleas of guilty because of the
[483]
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efficiency offered by the plea process is somewhat
surprising. Research in the lower courts indicates that
defendants who are charged with misdemeanors are most
concerned about how quickly the case can be resolved,
versus the outcome of the case.43 For individuals who are
charged with more severe offenses, we often assume that
there will be an increased concern with the procedures
and outcome of the case, versus the efficiency of the
process. Our finding, however, indicates that individuals
who are charged with a felony are not dissimilar from
individuals who are charged with less severe offenses
when making decisions about whether to enter a plea of
guilty.
Over half of the individuals who indicated that
they accepted a plea of guilty for reasons associated with
efficiency and uncertainty avoidance were incarcerated
pretrial. This finding is supported by prior research on
the impact of pretrial custody which indicates that
prosecutorial offers to “get out of jail” typically trumps
defendants’ interest in pursuing a trial because of the
time required to take a case to trial and the risks
associated.44 This finding is articulated through the
following statements made by defendants:
Personally, I would just go with whatever
they give me so I can hurry up and get out
of there. I just went on and told them yep,
yep, whatever, anything as long as it’s
going to get me out of here. (male, black,
felony)

FEELEY, supra note 3.
Albert A. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea
Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 61–62 (1968); Bowers, supra
note 22, at 1133; FEELEY, supra note 3; Gerard E. Lynch, Our
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2117, 2146 (1998).
43
44
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Nah, I ain’t taking nothing to trial. Plead,
give them what they want, get out. A lot of
people can’t take it to trial because they got
family shit at home. (male, black, felony)
While the majority of defendants articulated support for
an efficiency perspective of decision-making, how they
arrived at their final decision was nuanced and
contextualized by considerations of guilt and risk.
Defendants indicated that they decided not to take their
case to trial because it would require too much time and
money. However, this decision was often juxtaposed by
defendants stating that they were guilty—so why fight
it?—or that they did not want to risk the outcome of a
trial—so why spend the time on taking it to trial?
It’s too emotionally and physically
draining for somebody to have to go
through that [trial]. And then, you know,
that means I have to take more time off
work, more time finding someone to watch
my kids, more time to do this. It’s just not
worth it overall. I’ll take my responsibility.
I'm in trouble, I’ll take my year of
probation, I’ll do my fines and then it’s
done. It just seemed like an easier way to
go. Less fines. No jail time . . . I know I did
something
wrong.
(female,
white,
misdemeanor)
They was offering me six years, you know
what I’m saying, so I fought it. I fought it
for like four and a half months. I’m sitting
down in the county [jail] just fighting it.
Like no way, I’m not taking this. I didn’t
do nothing and I shouldn’t even be here.
But, like the deals are getting worse and
worse and worse. They first offered me 48
[485]
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months and then they went to 52 and then
they went to 57, so they kept climbing the
deals…No I didn’t take it to trial because
they said if I don’t take it to trial they’ll just
give me four more months. Just do four
more months because I already did four
more months. So they made it seem so
sweet to me, but it hurt me in the long run,
you know, because I’ve never been in jail
before. So I’m panicking, I’m in jail for four
months and I’m like oh my goodness seems
like I’ve been gone for like two years just
sitting in a little cage, cell by yourself is
crazy. I’ve never been in that position so I’m
like freaking out. I wanted to take it to
trial, but I just couldn’t handle the jail, you
know, and what if I did lose because, you
know, I don’t know. I would never want to
use it as an excuse, but you know I just felt
that I might have lost. If I would have lost,
I would have been sitting in prison for six
years. (male, black, felony)
B.
Deciding
to
Plead
Misunderstanding and Fear

Guilty—

While theories of efficiency, uncertainty
avoidance, and blameworthiness are associated with
defendants’ decisions to plead guilty, the most commonly
articulated factors that mediated decisions to accept a
plea of guilty were misunderstanding and fear. The
observational and interview findings of this study
suggest that defendants do not understand the charges
to which they are pleading guilty, the sentence, and the
consequences of entering a plea of guilty. Stemming from
misunderstandings about the plea process and the legal
language associated with plea bargains, defendants
entered pleas of guilty to exit a situation that they do not
[486]
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understand and have little control over.
I believe like at court when they brought it
up it was kind of like a deal saying that I
would have been on probation for two
years—felony probation. And you know, I
do kind of have a little experience with
court . . . but not really as an adult. So I
didn’t really know what was going to
happen. And I . . . you know I really didn’t
want to go through that whole process so I
took the first thing that was handed to me.
And that’s kind of what got me in this
situation . . . well not exactly this situation
but got me on probation. But you know I
really don’t, you know. And . . . ah . . . yeah,
I just feel like the decisions that was made
was a part of me being tired of dealing with
things, and not understanding what was
going on. . . . I just felt like I didn’t want to
deal with it. (male, black, felony)
Particularly when it’s your first time in
there, it’s scary. Everything is moving
quickly. A lot of people they talk like they
get very frustrated by that and they get
more scared because they have no idea
what’s going on, and then you’re asked to
make pretty quick decisions. And most
people like me myself personally I would
just go with whatever they give me so I can
hurry up and get out of there. Sometimes I
just agree just to get out of jail or to get out
of the court room. Like the day we were
there for the pre-trial [conference] I was
already ready to take whatever they were
going to give me. (male, black,
misdemeanor)
[487]
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I don’t even want to risk it. I’m not too—I
don’t know too much about the system or
the law or too much about that. I never
really had to deal with it like that. So
taking them to court, I think it would be a
waste of time because I don’t get it. I’ll just
move on. (male, black, misdemeanor)
Defendants often considered not accepting a plea of guilty
and taking their case to trial, but out of fear, ended up
accepting a plea of guilty. This finding is particularly
relevant as scholarly interest in wrongful convictions in
the U.S. has garnered increasing attention over the past
decade due in large part to a growing public awareness of
wrongful convictions, and the increasing number of
individuals whose sentences are vacated because they
were convicted of a crime that they did not commit. Since
1989, more than 2,100 people have had their sentences
vacated.45 In 2017 alone, more than 130 individuals were
identified as convicted for a crime that they did not
commit.46 Although estimates of the rate of wrongful
convictions vary, and typically focus on capital charges
and cases in which charges have been vacated,
observational and interview data collected in this study
suggest that defendants who are charged with
misdemeanor and felony offenses and whom claim
innocence do plead guilty.
I took a plea agreement without even
knowing what I was going to get. Like not
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, UNIV. OF CAL. IRVINE,
EXONERATIONS IN 2017, at 3(2017).
46 Id. This number does not include approximately 96
individuals whose drug-related convictions were found to be
the result of systematic framing on the part of police officers in
Baltimore and Chicago. Id. at 1. At the time of publication, 176
sentences have been vacated and more are expected to occur in
2018.
45
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even a full understanding, I just, I don’t
know. Like my public defender wanted me
to keep the plea as not guilty. Like he told
me that a couple times and like I just
wanted out. I’d rather, I guess I’d rather
have my plea as not guilty if I could have
stayed out and gone to trial. If I knew I was
going to be out then I pled not guilty
because I don’t think they could have
proved beyond reasonable doubt that I did
this because there was no evidence—there
is absolutely nothing . . . . Obviously, I
think I would win, but the whole “what if I
don’t.” What if I don’t, then I’m dead.
Because I’ve never been through the courts
before. I’ve never been to the jail before, so
I didn’t know anything. I had no idea what
was going on, like I’m just sitting there not
knowing if I’m going to get out and not
knowing if I needed to see the judge or what
was going on. And so, then that’s when I’m
just like well I just want to take the plea. I
just want to get out of here. I guess there
was another plea and I didn’t understand
the other one. I guess like I know that’s not
why, like you’re not supposed to take a plea
to get out of jail. Like you can’t do it I guess,
but I would say that’s pretty much what I
did just because I wanted it done with—so
I could move on. I guess I just kind of
misunderstood.
(male,
white,
misdemeanor)
I didn’t want to take the plea. I said, “No.
I don’t want to.” But now when it gets all
the way to this point and I got out and I got
all my jobs back. Fuck it. Now I got out I
might as well take it and get it over with.
[489]
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When I was in jail I said, let’s do something
right now. But no. Nobody wanted to do
nothing. But they gave me this opportunity
to get out and . . . I don’t want to take it to
trial now. (female, black, felony)
C. Perceptions of the Plea Outcome as Fair
Given the findings associated with defendant
decisions to accept a plea of guilty, it is compelling to
consider whether defendants perceive the outcomes and
procedures of their case as fair. Table 3 provides
information on the association between defendant
characteristics and the indicators of procedural fairness,
outcome fairness, and case participation. Over 60 percent
of defendants interviewed for this study expressed
positive perceptions of the procedures and outcomes of
their case while 72 percent expressed negative
perceptions of their ability to participate in their case.
Defendants charged with both felony and lesser charges
articulated positive perceptions of the plea process (62
percent) and outcome (62 percent and 81 percent,
respectively). Those individuals whose cases were
dismissed overwhelmingly agreed that the court process
and outcome was fair (100 percent); only one defendant
whose case was dismissed felt that he did not have input
in the process. Defendants who received a disposition
other than dismissal were still most likely to express
positive perceptions of the plea process (between 50 and
64 percent), but overwhelmingly expressed concern about
their ability to participate in the procedures and
outcomes of their case (between 66 and 92 percent).
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Table 3. Defendant Perceptions of Plea Bargaining
Process is Fair Outcome is Fair Participation
Total

Yes
27

No
13

Yes
28

No
12

Yes
11

No
29

(67.5%)

(32.5%)

(70.0%)

(30.0%)

(27.5%)

(72.5%)

Gender
Male
Female

23

8

24

7

11

20

(74.2%)

(25.8%)

(77.4%)

(22.6%)

(35.5%)

(64.5%)

---

(100.0%)

4

5

4

5

(44.4%)

(55.6%)

(44.4%)

(55.6%)

9

Race
White
African
American
Other

9

4

8

5

2

11

(69.2%)

(30.8%)

(61.5%)

(38.5%)

(15.4%)

(84.6%)

16

8

18

6

8

16

(66.7%)

(33.3%)

(75.0%)

(25.0%)

(33.3%)

(66.7%)

2

1

2

1

1

2

(66.7%)

(33.3%)

(66.7%)

(33.3%)

(33.3%)

(66.7%)

Charge
Misdemeanor
and Gross
Felony

10

6

13

3

7

9

(62.5%)

(37.5%)

(81.3%)

(18.7%)

(43.7%)

(56.3%)

17

7

15

9

4

20

(62.5%)

(37.5%)

(62.5%)

(37.5%)

(16.7%)

(83.3%)

6

---

6

---

5

1

(100.0%)

(83.3%)

(16.7%)

Disposition
Dismissed

(100.0%)

Convicted

Stay of Imposition

9

5

10

4

3

9

(64.2%)

(35.7%)

(71.4%)

(28.6%)

(20.0%)

(80.0%)

3

3

3

3

2

4

(50.0%)

(50.0%)

(50.0%)

(50.0%)

(33.3%)

(66.7%)

Continued
9

5

9

5

1

13

(64.2%)

(37.5%)

(64.2%)

(35.8%)

(7.1%)

(92.9%)
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Table 4. Defendant Perceptions of Plea Bargaining, by Process,
Outcome, and Participation
Process is
Outcome is
Fair
Fair
Participation
Yes
27
(67.5
%)

No
13
(32.5%
)

Yes
28
(70.0
%)

No
12
(30.0
%)

Yes
11
(27.5%
)

No
29
(72.5
%)

Y

--

--

25
(89.3
%)

2
(16.7
%)

11
(100.0
%)

16
(55.2
%)

N

--

--

3
(10.7
%)

10
(83.3
%)

0

13
(44.8
%)

Y

25
(92.5
%)

3
(23.0%
)

--

--

11
(100.0
%)

17
(58.6
%)

N

2
(7.5%
)

10
(77.0%
)

--

--

--

12
(41.4
%)

Y

11
(40.7
%)

0

11
(39.3
%)

0

--

--

N

16
(59.3
%)

13
(100.0
%)

17
(60.7
%)

12
(100
%)

--

--

Total

Procedure is
Fair

Outcome is
Fair

Participation

The two factors that were most strongly
associated with defendant perceptions of outcome
fairness was the belief that the outcome received was a
“good break” or that the outcome was “deserved.” This
result supports our finding that defendants weigh
considerations of blameworthiness and uncertainty
avoidance when deciding to accept a plea of guilty. It is
also supported by theories of distributive justice and
prior research on outcome satisfaction. For example,
Casper found that the majority of male defendants
describe their sentence as fair, and that perceptions of
outcome fairness was based on the belief that the
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sentence receives was less severe than was anticipated—
or at least the “going rate”—and appropriate to the
crime.47 Defendants interviewed for this study
articulated similar perceptions:
Yeah, I’m happy with the outcome. I was
really happy. I was hoping for what I was
offered, so I pretty much got what I was
expecting. (female, white, felony)
I thought that that they were going to put
me on some type of probation for a certain
amount of time where I would have to keep
coming back to my probation officer. A lot
of other things like that, you know, for like
six months or something, and I won’t be
able to get my driver’s license until I’m 21
or something, that’s what I thought was
going to happen. You know, so it was much
of a relief when they said—when she said
she might be able to switch it over to a
disorderly conduct. Since I had already
been in jail for two days and the police
officer maced me, I have had enough
punishment I guess. So I was really
relieved when that happened. I’m glad I
didn’t have to pay no ticket. That would
have been even worse. . . . At the end of the
day I’m happy with my outcome, yeah.
(male, black, misdemeanor)
Defendants—both those who were interviewed
and those whose cases were observed—who openly
discussed their guilt perceived the plea process as a
means to obtain an outcome that they felt they deserved.
In this sense, defendants who indicated satisfaction with
47

Casper, supra note 13.
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their outcome adopted a just deserts approach to their
outcome.48 As one defendant put it, “you do the crime, you
do the time.” Another defendant charged with three
felony counts of theft stated that he was “happy” with his
court experience:
Because of the outcomes that I received . . .
I face consequences for what I did and if I
wouldn’t have faced anything, if they had
just said, “Okay you can go on with your
business. Don’t ever do that again,” I never
would have learned from my mistakes. So I
believe that justice was served in my case. I
deserved my consequences. I have to take
part in what I did, pay for what I did.
(male, white, felony)
Particularly in DWI and property cases where
evidence is easily obtained through breathalyzers, blood
tests, video surveillance, and fingerprinting, the question
that loomed over defendants was not whether they would
take their case to trial to dispute guilt, but what plea offer
they would receive from the prosecutor. One defendant
who was ultimately convicted of felony check fraud
recounts, “Basically the deal that I got—there’s no other
better way that you could have ever put it, you know
what I mean? I didn’t have to go to jail and got the same
probation officer. To be honest with you, I probably
should have gotten a little bit worse punishment than I
did considering the fact of what I did.”

See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS (1993);
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS
AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS (1987);
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF
INCARCERATION, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS
(1976).
48
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D. Perceptions of the Plea Process as Fair
Over 90 percent of the defendants who were
interviewed for this study and who perceived their
outcome as fair also perceived the court process leading
to their outcome as fair. A defining measure of procedural
fairness in this study was whether defendants felt that
they were treated the same as other defendants, and
whether they felt fairly treated by the public defender—
conclusions arrived at by observing other cases and
talking to other indigent defendants. In most cases, the
considerable amount of waiting time required for a
defendant’s case to be called allows plenty of
opportunities to talk and mingle with other indigent
defendants in hallways, elevators, and smoking areas.
These interactions offer defendants a way to “blow off
steam” and “kill time,” but it also provides them with
information about others’ experiences, which they use to
assess their own situation. As one defendant stated after
stepping out of court, “They treat everyone the same, so
yeah, I would consider it fair, or fair enough.”
For this same reason, however, some defendants
perceive their treatment as unfair. In these cases,
defendants articulated concern that their case was being
handled the same as all other cases and not given
individual consideration. Defendants expressed concern
that they never had a conversation with their public
defender before pleading guilty and did not understand
the plea process that resulted in their outcome. One
defendant who was charged with a felony count of
property theft indicated that he was satisfied with his
outcome but dissatisfied with the process:
No, I don’t feel that I was treated fairly
going through the process, but, I mean,
what choice did I have. . . . He [the public
defender] never communicated with me.
Maybe he did do something, but I don’t
[495]
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know what he did. He never told me
anything. I was on my own. He said, “here
is what’s going to happen. This is your case,
so you go over here, go over there. Now you
just come back and go see the judge and
you’re on your way.” You know, and I’m like
“okay.” But, I mean, yes, I am happy with
the outcome. (male, black, felony)
This statement illustrates the frustration that
many defendants articulated about their public defender,
and how perception of public defenders’ behaviors can
influence defendant perceptions of fairness. Legal
scholars identify different and often competing
conceptions of the role of criminal defense lawyers;
however, most agree that zealous advocacy of defendants
is necessary and justified.49 The American Bar
Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility
states that it is a lawyer’s responsibility to “represent a
client zealously within the bounds of the law.”50 For
indigent defendants, perceptions of enthusiastic and
effective representation influence positive and negative
judgments of public defenders. Those who perceived their
public defender as an individual who is willing to fight
for their case—i.e., put time and effort into the case—
were most likely to talk positively about public defenders
THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 2, at 158; Abbe
Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life
and Fractured Ego of the Empathic, Heroic Public Defender, 37
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1203, 1209–10 (2004); Margareth Etienne,
Remorse, Responsibility, and Regulating Advocacy: Making
Defendants Pay for the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
2103, 2104–05 (2003); Charles J. Ogletree Jr., An Essay on the
New Public Defender for the 21st Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 81, 92 (1995); Charles J. Ogletree Jr., Beyond
Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public
Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1242 (1993).
50 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 1998).
49
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and feel as if they were fairly treated. As one incarcerated
black male stated, “I felt like she was great. She did
everything in her power, everything that she could
possibly do to give me the lesser charge possible or try to
get me out of it. She did everything that she could do. So
I felt she did her job really well.” Another white male
charged with felony theft stated:
Oh, I liked my public defender, she’s a great
attorney and I really appreciated her help.
I feel like she did a better job than other
public defenders I’ve ever had. It just
seemed like she had an actual knowledge of
the case, like she actually paid attention to
it. Most public defenders don’t even know
who you are until they look in your file
when they see you. She seemed like she
actually, you know, took the time and tried
to find out the best results and get
information. So, yeah, I was real
appreciative. I liked her, she was a good
person. (white, male, felony)
Defendants who perceived their public defender
as an individual who was not willing to fight for their case
were less likely to speak positively about their experience
with their legal representation and their court
experience:
Personally, to me, I want to have my own
lawyer next time. Pay my own lawyer,
‘cause I know if I got my own lawyer that
he’s gonna fight for me. The public defender
is not gonna fight for you. (black, male,
felony)
I think it’s just not fair, like the public
defenders are bullshit. Like you can call a
[497]
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real lawyer and he can get you less time,
but call a public defender and he can get
you the most time, you know what I’m
saying? Like if a public defender is
supposed to be a lawyer, right? So how
come they can’t act like the lawyer? It’s like
bullshit, you know. They’re supposed to try
their hardest. I bet you if somebody was
paying them, then they will try to go
harder, know what I mean? A lot of them
don’t care. They don’t care because they got
so many cases. They get paid for so many
cases, so they pretty much want to get you
in and get you out of their face. (black,
male, felony)
Research shows that the most common complaint
received by public defenders concerns the lack of time
and attention they give to defendants.51 Professional
conduct rules require that public defenders keep clients
informed of the status of their case and promptly respond
to client requests for information.52 The reality, however,
is that public defenders are often unable to comply with
professional duties because of circumstances that include
excessive caseloads and a failure to be appointed to a case
in a timely manner.53 When public defenders have too
Christopher Campbell et al., Unnoticed, Untapped, and
Underappreciated: Clients’ Perceptions of Their Public
Defenders, 33 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 751, 758–66 (2015); ROY B.
FLEMMING ET AL., THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE: POLITICS AND WORK
IN
CRIMINAL COURT COMMUNITIES (1992); cf. THE
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 2, at 95 (discussing the
inability of indigent defense attorneys to comply with their
professional duties due to, among other things, excessive
caseloads).
52 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 1998).
53 BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 2, at 22; THE CONSTITUTION
PROJECT, supra note 2, at 95.
51
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many cases, client contact suffers and sometimes
becomes virtually non-existent. Defenders become
unavailable to defendants because they are constantly in
court, which often forces initial public defenderdefendant meetings to take place in the courtroom.
Yeah, like the only reason that I would not
have him to be my lawyer again is basically
because of the miscommunication that we
had. It’s not something that he did with my
case wrong or anything. It’s just that I feel
like if I call, if I call you two or three times
a week and you don’t return any of my calls
or give me any type of response, something’s
wrong with that. Either you’re just ignoring
me or you don’t really care about what’s
going on with my case. You just want to get
it over with. And, you know, he has a lot of
other clients too, but that’s no reason. With
Monday through Friday, there’s no reason
that out of those days that I can’t get a
response from you from calling you two or
three times a week. (white, male, felony)
The hardest part is getting a hold of the
public defender. I was trying to get a hold
of the public defender, but they never call
you back or talk with you or anything like
that. So until your date, your next court
date—that’s the first time I talked with my
public defender. And all they do is come out
and ask for a new court date because they
haven’t had a chance to look over the case
at all. (white, male, felony)
He talked with me one time and he told me
the offer, that’s it. (black, male, felony)
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I wasn’t treated fairly because being treated
fairly is when you’re honest with your client
and you put everything on the table and let
them know what’s going on. (black, female,
felony)
Research by Tom Tyler and colleagues suggests
that defendants are most likely to report positive
perceptions of court actors if they understand what
motivates their behavior and decision-making.54
Authorities who act unexpectedly are not necessarily
judged to be untrustworthy if people feel that they
understand why they behave in the manner in which
they do. Conversations with the defendants in this study
confirm this finding. As articulated in the previous
statements, defendants critique public defenders but also
provide justification for their behaviors. For example, one
black male who received a stayed sentence for a series of
misdemeanor violations indicated that he was
disappointed in his lawyer’s willingness to fight for a
better plea negotiation—“He was alright, but he could
have tugged a little harder to get it down a little more.”
The defendant followed this statement with the following
explanation for the defender’s behavior:
He was pressed for time ‘cause he got to be
here, he got to be there. You can’t get mad
at them because they are overloaded. You
know, if you want to keep it real, they are
all public defenders, pretenders, or
whatever. They are all overloaded. They get
TYLER, supra note 42; Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural
Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of
Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 129 (1998); Tyler,
supra note 25, at 70; Tom Tyler & Robert J. Bies, Beyond
Formal Procedures: The Interpersonal Context of Procedural
Justice, in APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONAL
SETTINGS 78 (John S. Carroll ed., 1990).
54
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more and more every day. You know it’s a
wonder that all of them ain’t half crazy. It’s
not good. It’s not good. It’s not good. But,
that’s basically what it is, you know. It’s
bad because you—you ain’t have no faith in
the system, you know, ‘cause you ain’t got
nobody that’s gonna really fight for you.
Half of them can’t even negotiate on a plea
bargain, let alone on a trial. I guess that’s
probably even how they are taught in
college now-a-days, just to be a deal-maker.
(male, black, misdemeanor)
Another white female who received probation for
a misdemeanor indicated that she was concerned during
court because she expected to have more opportunities to
talk with her attorney, but also indicated that “there are
so many other cases and horrible things that happen,
that they can’t worry about [her].” Also, a black male who
was incarcerated for multiple misdemeanors stated,
Those public defenders, you can’t even talk
to them. It’s frustrating. You know that it’s
six or seven other people to this one person.
I mean like how many people can you
actually juggle by yourself? I thought
public defenders were supposed to be there
to help so why isn’t there more of them?
(male, black, misdemeanor)
Previous research indicates that defendants
express sentiments of distrust for public defenders.55 The
findings of this research, however, indicate that
defendants are not necessarily distrusting of public
defenders, but of the system that public defenders work
CASPER, supra note 24; Jonathan D. Casper, Did You Have a
Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, I Had a Public Defender,
1 YALE REV. LAW SOC. ACTION 4, 6 (1971).
55
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for. Public defenders are perceived by defendants as part
of a larger system that prescribes their behavior.
I do not really feel like he was on my side.
I’ll be honest with you. Not really. I'm just
another, you know, pawn on the
chessboard. He's just doing his job. Just
get ‘em in, get ‘em out, get ‘em in, get ‘em
out, you know? It’s just a job with the
prosecutor. (male, black, misdemeanor)
When you’re incarcerated they call them
“public pretenders.” But, you know, it’s the
truth because you know the prosecutors and
the public defenders they eat lunch
together, they go fishing together, you know
they just hang out together, they’re friends.
You know, so while they’re like eating
ravioli, it’s probably like, “Oh what do you
want to do with him? Okay I’ll give you
him, just let me beat this case right here.”
You know what I’m saying? It’s like chess
and it’s kind of messed up. (male, black,
felony)
It’s not fair because they work for the city.
So, he started working with the prosecutors
and seeing what they want to come up with,
but he’s not asking the client what’s going
on. It’s not fair. It was all him, him and the
prosecutor. The public defender is not fair;
it’s not justice because they do what they
want to do. What them and the prosecutor
want to do. (male, black, felony)
Statements such as these suggest that defendants
do not necessarily view the behavior of public defenders
as representative of the defenders themselves, but rather
as a reflection of the circumstances of their position in the
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criminal courts, which relies heavily on the plea process
to ensure efficient case progress. Defendants did not
perceive public defenders as apathetic but overextended.
This account of the plea process parallels criticisms
among scholars who argue that the criminal process has
evolved into a system of assembly line justice which is
most concerned with processing cases as quickly and
efficiently as possible.56 For these reasons, many
defendants are not provided with contact information for
their public defenders and, if they are, are not able to
reach the public defender or receive a return phone call.
A defendant who was charged with driving with a
cancelled license for the fifth time explained this
experience:
Yeah, you know, it’s just like a process, like
a processing plant. They just process you,
like they processing cattle. They say, “Okay
this is what they gonna do for you: so, so,
so, so. Now if you don’t do this here, now the
charge carries: so, so, so, so. Now I can get
you this here. Right now, today, I can get
you so, so, so, and then you go to jail.” You
BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 2; William Glaberson, Faltering
Courts, Mired in Delays, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/nyregion/justice-deniedbronx-court-system-mired-in-delays.html
[https://perma.cc/H3XX-FLA5]; William Galberson, Courts in
Slow Motion, Aided by the Defense, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 14, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/15/nyregion/justice-deniedcourts-in-slow-motion-aided-by-defense.html
[https://perma.cc/8W8T-A5NQ]; Ari Shapiro, Report Calls Out
Flaws In Public Defender System, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, (Apr. 15,
2009),https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
103108229 [https://perma.cc/3CQP-EBH6]; Cara Tabachnick,
In the Public Defense, THE CRIME REPORT, (Oct. 7, 2010),
http://www.thecrimereport.org/archive/in-the-public-defense
[https://perma.cc/GRQ8-5Z64].
56
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know, it’s just a process. You know, they
don’t have time to deal with no one
individual, ‘cause they can’t put too much
time in ‘cause they got so many. Like I say,
it’s like, “Come on down, you’re the first
contestant in The Price is Right!” It’s like
Monty Hall in Let’s Make a Deal. (male,
black, misdemeanor)
As this defendant articulates, the plea process can
move rapidly. On days in which the court calendar is
full—such as after the weekend or a holiday—or, in
courts that see a particularly high volume of cases—such
as property and drug courts—cases can move so quickly
that there is not time for the defendant to meet or talk to
their public defender. In conversations with defendants
after their first appearance, defendants were often
unable to state the name of their public defender, or how
they may be able to reach the defender. As one black male
defendant charged with 5th degree drug possession
articulates:
The first time I went through it, I was
terrified. I didn’t know what was going on.
I felt like I was from Asia and it’s my third
day here in America and I didn’t have no
English classes or whatever, so I’m
speaking a whole different language. And
they’re just like talking a foreign language
and I’m like, “What’s going on? I need to
talk to my lawyer.” I’m like, “but look I
don’t understand, like, you know, hold up.”
I just felt ignorant, you know what I mean.
The first time, I’m like “oh my.” I learned
everything I know about the court system
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being inside the jail and not from being in
court, not from my lawyer, but by sitting
there listening and watching other cases.
(male, black, felony).
E. Perceptions of Participation and SelfExpression
Despite the finding that most defendants perceive
the outcomes and procedures of their case as fair, over 70
percent of defendants did not feel like that they had
adequately participated in their cases. Table 3 indicates
that over half of all defendants who reported that the
process and outcome of their case was fair also indicated
that they did not have enough input in their case. This
finding is somewhat surprising. As cited previously, the
extant literature on perceptions of fairness argue that
when defendants feel as if they are a part of the
procedures of their case and have adequate opportunities
to voice their side of the story, positive attitudes of the
fairness of the outcome and procedures of their case
increase.57 Empirical studies that consider the plea
process, however, provide contradictory accounts of the
effect of participation in plea bargaining on perceptions
of fairness. For example, some scholars argue that plea
bargaining provides more control and a heightened sense
of efficacy because defendants are actively participating
in their case by pleading guilty in return for an agreed
upon sentence.58 In this regard, the process of plea
bargaining can provide defendants with greater certainty
over their outcome, leading to more positive evaluations
LIND & TYLER, supra note 27, at 9; THIBAUT & WALKER, supra
note 29.
58
Anne M. Heinz, Procedures Versus Consequences:
Experimental Evidence of Preferences for Procedural and
Distributive Justice, in COURTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
EMERGING JUSTICE (Susette M. Talarico, ed., 1985).
57
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of their process. Casper argues that in cases when
defendants receive an outcome that is not expected, they
are more likely to articulate limited participation in their
case and perceive the process as less fair.59 The findings
of our research also indicate that defendants who were
caught off-guard by the decisions of the court were more
likely to express negative attitudes. One defendant
charged with 2nd degree assault describes her experience
of receiving a more severe sentence than she anticipated:
No, we didn’t talk a lot. I left him [public
defender] a few messages, spoke to him on
the phone and asked him, you know
different questions about where I was
going. He said jail time was out of the
picture. I knew for a fact that jail time
wasn’t going to happen. I just knew that for
a fact that it was no jail time. And then on
the last day it’s jail time…it wasn’t an
honest way to come and tell me I was doing
jail time, to find out on the very last day
when I go to court that I’m going to get
sentenced to jail, and never heard it. Before
any conversation that we had, any
paperwork that I signed, he never said
anything. So then I come to court and
expect probation, monetary probation,
strict probation, or whatever and then have
to get locked up. I thought that was very
unfair because that was the first time I
heard of it before going into court. I just
wished he would have talked to me more
and prepared me a little bit more. When I
59

CASPER, supra note 24.
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expected no jail time and then when I got
jail time it was like, “oh well, you got jail
time.” It was like “case closed” for him. Like
I know he had to know ahead of time before
five minutes before court. So, oh well, I just
got to live with it and do my time I guess. I
would have felt good if I would have had a
chance to speak more and explain myself.
Then I would have been prepared for this,
but like I said, it all hit me like five minutes
before we went to court, so I wasn’t really
expecting that. And the judge, the judge
just agreed to everything that was going on
and did not take time to listen to my side.
So, I guess I get the shit end of the stick.
(female, white, felony)
In more serious felony cases, such as this one,
defendants are less likely to be certain of the outcome of
their plea agreement when they sign it. Unlike
misdemeanor cases, in which most cases are settled on
the first or second day in court, felony cases can be
extended for over a year (as in this case), and often
involve pre-plea agreements. In cases in which pre-pleas
are signed, the defendants admit their guilt and consent
to an interview and evaluation by probation that
presumably guides the decision of the judge. In most
cases, public defenders promote pre-plea evaluations as
an opportunity to decrease defendant sentences because
they offer the judge and other court members a more
thorough understanding of the defendant’s history and
the situation surrounding the case. However, defendants
often become frustrated after reading these reports
because they do not feel as if the probation officer
adequately represents them—most articulated concern
that the report contained negative information that was
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not reported by the defendant, such as drug and alcohol
use.
Differences in procedures between felony and
misdemeanor cases may understandably influence the
experience of defendants. Table 5 reports defendant
perceptions of procedures, outcomes, and case
participation by case severity. These results indicate that
the most prevalent difference between individuals
charged with felonies and less severe charges is the
association that defendants draw between having a voice
and fair procedures and outcomes. Individuals who are
charged with felonies, compared to those who are charged
with less severe offenses, are less likely to indicate that
they adequately participated in their case (16 percent
compared to 43 percent) and less likely to associate their
participation with procedural and outcome fairness. Only
23 percent of felony defendants agreed that they
participated in procedures that they experienced as fair
(compared to 70 percent of misdemeanor/gross
misdemeanor defendants); 26 percent agreed that they
had participated in outcomes they perceived as fair
(compared to 53 percent of misdemeanor/gross
misdemeanor defendants). Prior examinations of the
relationship between case severity and court experiences
suggests that case severity can influence defendants’
interest in their case, particularly when the outcomes are
more severe.60 This research provides support for such
claims. Defendants in this study who were charged with
lower-level offenses were more likely to express apathy
towards the procedures and outcome of their case. For
example, when asked whether defendants would prefer
more opportunities to be involved in their case, one
Hispanic male charged with a misdemeanor count of
contempt of court responded that the courts can “do what
they want.” When we subsequently asked if he felt that
he was treated with respect, he indicated that he “has
never really thought about it.” Statements such as these
60

Heinz, supra note 58.
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by defendants support observed differences in
misdemeanor and felony courts. Defendants in
misdemeanor courts more frequently “blow-off” court
dates. They plead guilty without talking with their public
defender about options other than the original plea
offered by the state. Defendants charged with
misdemeanors are also more likely to arrive to court
alone without family or friends, whereas in felony
courtrooms, family members, friends, and caseworkers
provide a regular show of support, concern, and input
into defendant decision-making.
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Table 5. Defendant Perceptions of Plea Bargaining, by
Process, Outcome, Satisfaction, and Charge Level
Outcome is
Process is Fair
Fair
Participation
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Misdemean
10
6
13
3
7
9
or and
(62.5%) (37.5%) (81.3%) (18.7%) (43.7%) (56.3%)
Gross
Procedure is Y
Fair
N

Outcome is
Fair

Y
N

Participation Y
N

Felony

--

--

--

10
0
7
3
(76.9%)
(100.0%) (33.3%)
3
3
0
6
(23.1%) (100.0%
(66.7%)
)

10
3
(100.0%) (50.0%)
0

3
(50.0%)

--

--

--

--

7
0
7
0
(70.0%)
(53.8%)
3
6
6
3
(30.0%) (100.0%) (46.1%) (100.0%
)

7
6
(100.00% (66.7%)
)
0
3
(33.3%)
--

--

--

--

17
7
15
9
4
20
(62.5%) (37.5%) (62.5%) (37.5%) (16.7%) (83.3%)

Procedure is Y
Fair
N
Outcome is
Fair

--

--

--

--

--

Y

15
(88.2%)

0

N

2
7
(11.8%) (100.0%)

Participation Y
N

15
2
4
13
(100.0%) (22.2%) (100.0%) (65.0%)
0
7
0
7
(77.8%)
(35.0%)
--

--

--

--

4
0
4
0
(23.5%)
(26.7%)
13
7
11
9
(76.4%) (100.0%) (73.3%) (100.0%
)

4
11
(100.00% (55.0%)
)
0
9
(45.0%)
--

--

--

--

[510]
53
52

PLEADING GUILTY
13 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 459 (2019)

IX. Conclusion
Research indicates that the majority of
individuals charged with a crime plead guilty. This study
focuses on why defendants decide to plead guilty versus
take their case to trial and their perceptions of the plea
process and outcomes. Our findings suggest that
defendants decide to plead guilty, regardless of
innocence, because the process provides the quickest
pathway out of court and with little risk. The decision to
enter a plea of guilty is also influenced by confusion over
court processes and outcomes, and fear of what may
happen if the defendant does not accept a plea deal.
While outcomes associated with plea bargaining are
considered by defendants to be by and large fair—
primarily because the outcome was expected and
perceived as comparable to the outcomes that others
receive—defendants do not always perceive the plea
process as fair. Dissatisfaction with the legal
representation and perceived lack of control and input in
the decisions of their case are key factors that influence
perceptions of procedural fairness and justice.
Scholars and legal practitioners often argue that
defendants’ decisions to plead guilty reflects their guilt
and a concern for taking responsibility for their
behaviors. The courts—particularly federal courts—have
supported the position that defendants should receive
leniency in exchange for accepting blame for their
actions.61 However, while defendant guilt may play a
mediating effect in defendant decision-making, the
findings of this research indicate that guilt has little
direct effect on the decision to plead guilty. Rather, the
efficiency that the plea process provides is a primary
influence on defendant decision-making. Many scholars
argue that as the number of individuals who intersect
with the courts increases, plea bargaining provides a
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2009).
61
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quick, inexpensive way to handle growing dockets.62 The
findings of this research suggest that the plea bargaining
process is not only preferred by court actors, but also by
the defendants, who are also influenced by a desire to
“just get it over with.”
In addition to the time and money saved by
pleading guilty, defendants indicated that they preferred
the certainty of plea deals. Research shows that
defendants who decide to take their case to trial and are
found guilty frequently receive more severe sentences
than they would if they had pled guilty. Plea-trial
disparity research shows that some defendants receive a
sentence at trial that is up to ten times more severe than
defendants with similar charges and backgrounds who
decide to plead guilty.63 The results of this study echo
these findings, with defendants articulating concern for
the risk associated with taking their case to trial. Many
defendants felt as if they were receiving a “break” or a
See sources cited supra note 18.
See Brian D. Johnson et al., The Social Context of Guidelines
Circumvention: The Case of Federal District Courts, 46
CRIMINOLOGY 737 (2008); Nancy J. King et al., When Process
Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After Guilty Plea,
Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 959 (2005); McCoy, supra note 22; Darrell
Steffensmeier & Stephen Demuth, Ethnicity and Judges’
Sentencing Decisions: Hispanic-Black-White Comparisons, 39
CRIMINOLOGY 145 (2001); Darrell Steffensmeier & Stephen
Demuth, Ethnicity and Sentencing Outcomes in U.S. Federal
Courts: Who is Punished More Harshly?, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 705
(2000); Shawn D. Bushway & Anne Morrison Piehl, Judging
Judicial Discretion: Legal Factors and Racial Discrimination
in Sentencing, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 733 (2001); Celesta A.
Albonetti, An Integration of Theories to Explain Judicial
Discretion, 38 SOC. PROBS. 247 (1991); Gary D. LaFree,
Adversarial and Nonadversarial Justice: A Comparison of
Guilty Pleas and Trials, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 289 (1985); Ruth D.
Peterson & John Hagan, Changing Conceptions of Race:
Towards an Account of Anomalous Findings of Sentencing
Research, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 56 (1984).
62
63
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“good deal” and were not willing to take the chance that
they may be acquitted or receive a more lenient sentence
from a judge or jury at trial.
An important finding of this research is the
influence that misunderstanding has on the decisionmaking process of defendants. The findings of this study
illustrate that defendants arrive at the decision to plead
guilty through a series of justifications that are
influenced by the strain of making a quick decision and a
lack of understanding about plea bargaining, court
procedures, and the implications of sentencing outcomes.
Although defendants’ decisions to plead guilty may be
adequately described by an efficiency or uncertainty
avoidance perspective, the final decision to accept a plea
is influenced by a combination of factors that include
guilt, time and financial concerns, and fear. These
considerations are mediated by a lack of understanding
of the legal procedures and language associated with the
court system.
Notably, this study is the first to examine plea
bargain decision-making through interviews with
defendants. In doing so, the findings advance our
understanding of how defendants arrive at the decision
to plead guilty and contribute to knowledge about
whether defendants perceive the plea process and
outcome as fair. Prior research argues that individuals
who perceive case proceedings as fair are more likely to
view outcomes as fair and report overall satisfaction with
their court experience.64 Also, procedures that provide
defendants with the opportunity to have a voice and
participate in the decisions made in their case are more
likely to feel fairly treated, respected, and valued by court
actors.65 In this study, however, most defendants did not
report a sense of participation in their case; yet, over twothirds of defendants perceived both the plea procedures
CASPER, supra note 24; Casper, supra note 13.
Christopher Campbell et al., supra note 51, at 759; Casper,
supra note 13.
64
65
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and outcome of their case as fair. In fact, most defendants
spoke positively about the outcomes of their case and
believed that they received sanctions that were deserved
and less severe than they had anticipated. Defendants
perceived their court experience as fair because it
mirrored other defendants’ experiences; for the most
part, defendants felt that they were all treated the same,
for the good and the bad.
Yet, defendants in this study did not necessarily
feel that they were treated well or fairly by their public
defenders. Defendants who expressed both positive and
negative perceptions of public defender behavior,
however, attributed the behavior to the social and
situational circumstances of the courts. Attribution
theories argue that people make distinctions between
persons and their social situations.66 Social attributions
occur when individual behavior is interpreted in terms of
situational forces and, particularly, when an individual
is a member of a group. For example, Vincent Yzerbyt
and Anouk Rogier argue that “social attribution is
especially likely to be at work when perceivers believe
that they are confronted with a clear social entity, a
coherent whole,” and that social attribution is “of
paramount importance for the rationalization and
justification function of stereotypes.”67 Defendants in this
study attributed the behaviors of public defenders to the
“system”—public defender behavior is therefore a
consequence of being a worker in “The Public Defender’s
Office” which is funded by “The State” or “The System.”
The legitimacy of public defenders as figures of authority
See generally Daniel T. Gilbert, Ordinary Personology, in 2
THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 89 (Daniel T. Gilbert,
Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998).
67 Vincent Yzerbyt & Anouk Rogier, Blame It on the Group:
Entitativity, Subjective Essentialism, and Social Attribution, in
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON
IDEOLOGY, JUSTICE, AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 103, 105
(John T. Jost & Brenda Major eds., 2001).
66
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is contextualized by defendant beliefs about the court
system. Defendants viewed public defenders as acting
legitimately or, at the very least, consistently in this
social context—i.e., eager to plead defendants guilty,
disinclined to give them much time, and not concerned
about their welfare. In this regard, although defendants
do not trust the motives of public defenders—because
they are dictated by the system—they trust that they will
receive the legal representation of an overburdened
public defender.
Importantly, defendant attitudes toward the
procedures and outcome of their case are not necessarily
contingent on perceptions of fairness or trust of public
defenders. Defendants do not feel as if they receive fair
treatment or necessarily trust public defenders to
represent their best interests, but they express
satisfaction with the plea process and outcomes. Processbased models of regulation state that defendants who
lack confidence in their lawyer are not only likely to
harbor negative feelings about the law but are also more
likely to resist the lawyer’s and court’s advice regarding
the implications of future non-law-abiding behavior.68
Past research notes that defendants often lay full blame
for the faults of the system on their public defender.69 The
findings of this research, however, argue that defendants
contextualize the behaviors of their public defender.
Public defenders are criticized and often blamed by
defendants, but they are also seen as part of a larger
system that is out of both the public defender’s and the
defendant’s control. Thus, the legitimacy of the criminal
justice system is questioned by defendants more so than
TYLER & HUO, supra note 31; Tyler, supra note 31, at 311;
Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 31, at 515; Tyler & Wakslak,
supra note 31, at 259.
69 CASPER, supra note 24, at 85; Roy B. Flemming, Client
Games: Defense Attorney Perspectives on Their Relations with
Criminal Clients, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 253, 258 (1986);
Casper, supra note 55, at 6.
68
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the actual behaviors of public defenders and the
relationships they establish with defendants.
Defendant evaluations of the courts are also not
necessarily contingent on their experiences and
evaluations of law enforcement. Research consistently
finds that poor individuals, especially minorities,
embrace negative attitudes about police, which is based
on personal experiences and the experiences of others in
their community.70 Many scholars argue that legal
perspectives are created through interactions with law
enforcement; negative perceptions of police practices spill
over to other areas of the criminal justice and political
systems.71 Yet, this may not always be the case. In this
project, defendants spoke unexpectedly and at length
about police misconduct. Defendants complained first
and foremost about their treatment by police and the
fairness of the charges against them. This is to say that,
for the most part, defendants blamed law enforcement for
their status as a defendant in a criminal case and
subsequently viewed the courts as “just doing their job.”
This finding may be negative or positive depending on
how it is interpreted. On the one hand, defendants can
differentiate between criminal justice institutions, their
role in their criminal process, and their treatment by
criminal justice personnel, indicating that the legitimacy
of the criminal justice and political systems are not
necessarily always overshadowed by the actions of law
enforcement. On the other hand, this finding may
indicate that the poor may be so disillusioned by police
practices that they can only interpret court experiences
Elaine B. Sharp & Paul E. Johnson, Accounting for Variation
in Distrust of Local Police, 26 JUST. Q. 157, 159–60 (2009);
Hurwitz & Peffley, supra note 37, at 781; Weitzer & Tuch
(2002), supra note 37, at 442–43; Weitzer & Tuch (1999), supra
note 37, at 502; Scaglion & Condon, supra note 37, at 486, 489.
71 TYLER, supra note 42, at 95; Bobo & Thompson, supra note
32, at 447; Bobo & Johnson, supra note 38.
70
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as more positive than their experiences with the police.
In generalizing these findings to the total
population of defendants, we note that this research
relies only on adult criminal defendants located in a midsized Midwestern town. Defendants in smaller or larger
areas may have different court experiences. Sentencing
guidelines also vary by state, and, as the first state to
implement determinant sentencing, Minnesota may not
reflect the practices of states that still rely on
indeterminate sentencing practices. Sentencing rules
and guidelines may, in turn, significantly affect
defendant experiences and decisions. For example,
defendants in Hennepin County speak openly about
situating their decisions and experiences within the
boundaries of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines (i.e.
“the grid”). Therefore, while defendants may not feel
satisfied with their outcome, they feel fairly treated
because they assume that guidelines guarantee that
similar defendants receive similar outcomes.
At the same time, this research includes only
those defendants who are represented by a public
defender. Individuals represented by public defenders
are the largest and most socially disadvantaged
population of defendants in the criminal courts. Unlike
indigent defendants, affluent defendants may be more
likely to hire a private attorney and afford the costs of
childcare and time away from work, which defendants in
this study indicated as key considerations to accepting a
plea of guilty. More affluent individuals are also less
reliant on governmental assistance, which often
stipulates that an individual may not receive assistance
if they have a criminal conviction. Due to these
differences in circumstances, it is likely that the decisionmaking considerations and processes of defendants in
this research are different than the population of
defendants who are not represented by public defenders.
Despite the limitations of this research, the
implications are significant. This research shows that
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defendants plead guilty because they are confused,
scared, and feel coerced. Since plea bargaining was first
implemented over a century ago, scholars have argued
that the process creates a coercive atmosphere for
defendants—defendants feel that they have to plead
guilty or risk receiving a more severe sentence at trial,
even if they are innocent.72 The findings of this research
support this argument, with defendants expressing fear
of taking their case to trial. Even those defendants who
originally enter a plea of not guilty with the intention to
pursue a trial ultimately plead guilty out of fear that the
outcome at trial might result in more significant
consequences. While Minnesota does not have a strict
guideline rule that reduces sentences for those who plead
guilty, public defenders rely heavily on sentencing
guidelines and grids to illustrate minimum and
maximum sentences to defendants. Public defenders may
not insist that defendants take a plea bargain; however,
they do adamantly remind defendants that if they do not
accept a plea, they may go to trial and receive the
maximum sentence. In the most direct situations,
defenders openly inform defendants that the judge has
indicated that if they take the case to trial, that they will
be given the maximum sentence allowed by law.
Our findings also indicate that fairness is not
monolithic and can take on different meanings across
individuals who are accused of a crime. For example,
defendants in this study were most likely to associate the
even distribution of justice—outcomes and procedures—
with fairness. This finding is contrary to research by
Tyler and colleagues that found that defendants did not
define their experience based on their ability to
participate and have input in the procedures of their

Bowers, supra note 22, at 1120; McCoy, supra note 22, at 69;
Bibas, supra note 7, at 2531; Langbein, supra note 10, at 16
(citing People v. Byrd, 162 N.W.2d 777, 787 (Mich. Ct. App.
1968) (Levin, J., concurring)).
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case.73 Most frequently, defendants relied on the fair
application of the law in their case. This result is
particularly compelling when considered in light of
research showing disparity in arrests and sentencing
severity between black and white individuals and,
particularly, those charged with drug and property
offenses.74 This finding may be less surprising, however,
when we consider that the poor are far more likely to be
the subject of unfair and discriminatory treatment on a
daily basis and in their own communities. As Merry
argues, most lower-class Americans believe that society
is unfair, unjust, and that everyone’s rights are not
equally protected.75 Therefore, when poor defendants
receive unsatisfactory treatment from the courts, they
are not alienated—they are perhaps not even aware of
being treated unfairly—because the experience is similar
to experiences with other state actors and institutions.76
As some of the most socially marginalized individuals in
our society, poor defendants do not expect to have a voice
or to receive the same treatment as individuals with more
social status. They do not have the expectation that law
officials will give them and their story adequate
consideration, and they do not consider criminal courts
as a space in which their self-value and identity is
defined.
Perhaps the most important implication of this
73 LIND & TYLER,

supra note 27, at 216; Tyler & Bies, supra note
54, at 89.
74 DORIS MARIE PROVINE, UNEQUAL UNDER THE LAW: RACE IN
THE WAR ON DRUGS (2007); WESTERN, supra note 36, at 50.
75 Sally E. Merry, Concepts of Law and Justice Among WorkingClass Americans: Ideology as Culture, 9 LEGAL STUD. F. 59, 68–
69 (1985).
76 JOE SOSS ET AL., DISCIPLINING THE POOR: NEOLIBERAL
PATERNALISM AND THE PERSISTENT POWER OF RACE 181 (2011);
COLE, supra note 36, at 8; Austin Sarat, “. . . The Law Is All
Over”: Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the
Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343, 374 (1990).
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research, therefore, is that criminal justice reforms are
needed to ensure the rights of indigent defendants. Once
indigent defendants are swept into the criminal courts,
they are required to navigate a system that they do not
understand. Defendants are required to make quick
decisions that have significant implications on their lives,
families, and communities; however, their decisions are
bounded by limited information and an incomplete
comprehension of the procedures and meanings of
sentences. Plea bargaining allows agents of the court to
move through cases quickly and rationalize that plea
bargains are fair because defendants make the decision
to plead guilty. This research shows that we should not
presume such a simplistic and idealistic conclusion.
Future research should consider how we can strengthen
the position of defendants by providing defendants access
to dispositional advisors, or staff that are available to
counsel defendants about their decision-making
processes. If courts are not capable of providing
defendants adequate representation and informed
decision-making, this research suggests that we need to
reconceptualize the meaning of “fairness” in the court
system.
Finally, this research speaks to the current state
of our criminal courts and their reliance on the plea
process. Over the past few decades, scholars have focused
on sentencing, incarceration, and the reentry of
prisoners, to the neglect of investigations into indigent
defense representation and the processes of criminal
courts. The lack of attention to and investment in
ensuring the rights of defendants and the quality of legal
representation is startling considering the continued
support for “tough on crime” policies that increase the
stakes for a staggering number of individuals whose lives
are affected by the courts. Yet, and in despite of these
changes, this research offers evidence that indicates that
defendant attitudes have remained relatively stable over
time. In particular, the results of this research
complement early studies of defendants. In the 1970s,
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Casper noted that not only did defendants speak
positively about the plea process, but that most
defendants preferred to “cop out” and accept a plea: “the
defendant doesn’t see himself as giving up anything of
great value: he is simply speaking words, and they don’t
seem to mean very much.”77 Although interactions with
the criminal justice system and the severity of sanctions
have increased, it does not appear to be the case that
defendant experiences or expectations of what the courts
can offer has changed much at all.
Future research and policy reforms should focus
attention to increasing defendants’ understanding of
their court experiences. We should also consider how
defendant attitudes towards the fairness of their
procedures and outcomes vary over time. As time passes,
defendants may learn new information about court
processes or experience the ramifications of their
disposition in different ways. Consequences of criminal
cases that have additional impacts over time may lead
people to reconsider their fairness evaluations. As one
defendant indicated, “At the time it was really about
being fair. I mean, I don’t really know looking back on it
if I consider it to be a fair deal. But at the time, it was
just kinda like . . . what I get is what I get type of thing.”
This research offers a unique and important
perspective of our courts. In doing so, it begs the question
whether we should be expecting more from our courts or
be satisfied to know that most defendants perceive their
treatment as “fair enough.” In many regards, it is
possible that most defendants cannot even conceptualize
what “justice” might look like in the court system, given
that the majority are represented by attorneys who are
overworked, underpaid, and have little time to give
adequate attention to each case. Given the infrequency of
trials, most defendants have no point of comparison to
the plea process. This is difficult to assess, but it is
77

CASPER, supra note 24, at 85.
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conceivable that if we increased our expectations of fair
treatment by law enforcement and other institutional
actors, the standards of court experiences would not be
set so low. This research asserts that most defendants are
satisfied with the procedures and outcomes of their cases,
but it does not imply that defendants perceive the court
system to care about their well-being or the implications
of court sanctions on their lives.
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